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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Paul Bairas,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.
Lanard Johnson and Norman Cram,
co-administrators of the estate of
Philip G. Fulstow, deceased,

No. 9599

Defendants-Respondents

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

The appellant is herein referred to as plaintiff and
respondents as defendants, as they appeared in the lower
court.
This reply brief answers new material set forth in
respondents-defendants' brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. DEFENDANTS' CONTENTION THAT
THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT CONSIDER
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE BECAUSE THE MOTION AND AFFI1
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DAVITS WERE NOT TIMELY FILED IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE (1) THE MOTION WAS
AN ORAL MOTION PROPERLY MADE IN
OPEN COURT WHICH DID NOT REQUIRE
PRIOR NOTICE AND (2) THE EARLIER REQUIREMENT OF AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT
OF THIS TYPE OF MOTION WAS REPEALED
AND CLEARLY ABOLISHED BY THE ADOPTION OF RULE 40(b) UTAH RULES OF PROCEDURE.
At the trial, such as it was, on September 20, 1961,
plaintiff made and repeated an oral motion for a continuance (R. 55, 58, 61, 71, 82), providing in support
thereof two affidavits ( R. 40, 43, 73). Defendants
vigorously opposed this motion on the ground that it was
not timely filed, citing Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
6(d), 8(d) and 59(c) (R. 52). This same ground was
repeatedly pressed upon the trial court (R. 53, line 17,
29; R. 54, line 16; R. 60, line 15, 27; R. 67, line 9;
R. 82, line 25). This continued and repeated insistence
led the trial court into the error of assuming that the
motion was, in fact, not timely (R. 73, line 13).
Defendants continue to assert this ground here. It
is a faulty argument, however, because none of the rules
cited by defendants requires that a motion for continuance be in writing or that notice thereof be given ahead
of time if the motion is made in open court; nor do the
citations require affidavits at all in support of the motion, let alone that they be filed ahead of time. Nor have
we been able to find any currently in force statute or
rule supporting the defendants' position.

2
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In support of their position, defendants cited Rules
6 ( d ) , 8 ( d ) and 59 (c) to the trial court ( R. 52) . Rule
6 (d) refers only to the time that motions in writing
must be served but it does not state that this motion
must be in writing; Rule 8 (d) refers only to the failure
to deny in the pleadings and we assume it to be an
inadvertant slip of the tongue; Rule 59 (c) refers only
to the rna tter of affidavits filed in support of a motion
for a ne\v trial.
In their brief, defendants assert that Rule 6 (d) is
applicable, requires the serving of notice and is controling on this controversy (Brief 14) . They also assert
as a corollary therefrom that the trial court, and this
court, could not consider the affidavits filed at the time
of making the motion for continuance.
The fallacy in this argument is defendants' contention that Rule 6(d) requires that an oral motion made
in open court must, despite the inconsistency involved
and that the rule does not so state, be in writing and filed
and served ahead of time. The truth is that Rule 6 (d)
is concerned only with the time involved if a motion is
a written motion and not one presented in open court.
It does not purport to require that a motion for a continuance be a written motion.
Rule 7 (b) ( 1) provides that "An application to the
court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made
during a hearing or trial, shall be in writing,
"
(emphasis added)
Taken together these two rules simply mean that
an oral motion made in open court need not be preceded

3
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by notice (unless some other rule or statute might so
require) but where a motion is not one made in open
court it must be in writing and certain notice given.
Plaintiff's motion was properly made in open court-no
notice beforehand was required.
Defendants further assert that the affidavits filed
in suport of the motion were untimely and must be
stricken. This contention fails because affidavits are not
required to support a motion for continuance despite defendants' suggestion at pages 13 and 14 of their brief
that such is the case.
Though defendants cite and quote from Rule 40 (b)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, they fail to indicate that
the rule contains no requirement of affidavits and they
further fail to mention that the reporter's note immediately following the rule establishes that "The motion
need not be by affidavit as required formerly in the
statute." The statute referred to is Utah Code Anno.
1943, 104-23-10 which was repealed when the Rules
were adopted and which did require affidavits in certain
instances to support a· motion for continuance.
The mention in Rule 6 (d) that "When a motion is
supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with
the motion; . . ." can, when the entire rule is read, only
have reference to affidavits in support of motions which
must be in writing and must be served, not oral motions
made in open court which, according to the rules need
not be in writing and need not be served ahead of time.
Since there is no requirement of advance notice or of
affidavits, the authorities cited by defendants at pages

4
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14· and 15 of their brief are not in point, having been
decided with reference to the repealed statute or an
entirely different rule of procedure. Canning v. Star Publishing Company, 19 F.R.D. 281 (Del. 1956) concerns
a motion for summary judgment under the federal rules
\vhich have specific requirements for service of the motion before the time fixed for hearing. This case is not
in point. The Utah cases of Lancino v. Smith, 36 Utah
4:62, 105 P. 914 ( 1909) and McGrath v. Tallent, 7 Utah
256, 26 P. 574 ( 1891) are cited by defendants in support of their theory that affidavits must be filed and
served ahead of time in the case of a motion for a continuance. Defendants' citations to these cases omit the
date of the case and they do not tell us that these cases
were decided under the earlier statutory provision requiring such affidavits. Since this statutory requirement
is no longer in force, these cases add little to the defendants' position; rather they point out the weakness of
defendants' argument.
It would indeed be an unfair and arbitrary rule if
a motion for continuance could not in a proper case such
as this one be made in open court. In this instance
preparations had been made for plaintiff and his California counsel to travel to Utah for trial (R. 113) and
only at the last moment was plaintiff, paralyzed from
the neck down by the accident in controversy, informed
that he would not be able to attend. The rule advocated
by defendants would be a temendous boon to those whose
only interest is the avoidance of payment of just personal
injury claims because in a case such as this where unforseen matters can arise on short notice it would be abso5
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lutely impossible to give the notice defendants now ask.
Such an arbitrary rule would shock the conscience of
any fair-minded man and would violate the fundamental
rules of due process and fair play.
Plaintiff's motion for a continuance was properly
made and although there was no requirement of affidavits, affidavits were provided to show the reasons
for the motion. Despite plaintiff's assertion that this
motion was timely ( R. 55, 58, 61, 72), defendants' continued insistence that it was not and that the court could
not consider it led the trial court into error which must
no be repeated here. The error induced by defendants
in this regard can only have had the effect of depriving
plaintiff of the court's proper consideration of the motion
and the affidavits in support thereof. For this reason
alone the judgment must be reversed and plaintiff granted
a ne\\r trial.
POINT II. DEFENDANTS' POINT III, BASED
UPON THE DEAD MAN STATUTE AND THE
WRONGFUL DEATH ACT, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT BECAUSE IT WAS
NEITHER PRESENTED TO NOR PASSED
UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT BUT IS RAISED
IMPROPERLY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.
Defendants' Point III rests upon the assumption that
plaintiff, in fact, had only the evidence of the plaintiff
himself upon which to go to trial and that either the
Dead Man Statute (Utah Code Anno. 1953, 78-24-2(3))
or the Wrongful Death Act (Utah Code Anno. 1953,

6
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78-11-12 ) , or both, then functioned to require the trial
court to dismiss the plaintiff's action.
In our Point III we will show the substantive fallacies
in this argument. We are now concerned only with. the
question of whether this court can or should consider
these issues at all. The issues raised by these contentions
of the defendants are neither simple nor few. There are
complex and intricate fact and law problems involved
in any controversy concerning the Dead Man Statute.
There are equally complex and intricate fact and law
problems involved in any controversy concerning the
Wrongful Death Act. None of these problems was presented to the trial court. None of these problems was
passed upon by the trial court. The record is completely
devoid of any reference to these many potential issues
in any shape or form. The trial court had no opportunity
to hear or determine any of the many-faceted fact and
law problems such a presentation would entail.
Whether presented in an argument ostensibly designed
to uphold the decision of the lower court, or by any other
device, these many complicated law-fact issues now
raised by defendants were never presented to the trial
court, \Vere never passed upon by the trial court and are
now improperly raised here for the first time on appeal.
Defendants cite no authority in support of their raising
of these complex new matters for the first time on appeal.
Indeed, with the rare exception wherein the court acts
to prevent an otherwise unpreventable serious miscarriage of justice, the rule that an appellate court will not
entertain matters first raised on appeal is probably the
most consistently followed of all the salutory rules gov-
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erning either trial or appellate practice. This court had
an attempt to raise the issue of the Dead Man Statute
for the first time on appeal presented to it within the
rela~ively recent past. In disposing of this attempt, the
court said, in Obradovich v. Walker Bros. Bankers, 80
Utah 587, 16 P.2d 212, 218 (1932)
Though we assume the witness because of her
interest to be incompetent by reason of the statute
to testify in this case, yet, under the state of the
record we are satisfied that question is not before
us. The question not having been raised in the
trial court, we do not feel at liberty to pass on the
question now argued by appellant in this court
for the first time.
The rule that new matter will not be entertained on
appeal is in accord with other decisions of this court and
other courts.
Huber v. Deep Creek Irrigation Co., 6 Utah 2d 15,
305 P.2d 478 (1956); U.S. Building & Loan Assn'n v.
Midvale Home Finance Corp., 86 Utah 522, 46 P.2d
672 ( 1935) ; Idaho State Bank of Twin Falls, Idaho~ v.
Hooper Sugar Co., 74 Utah 24, 276 P. 659 (1929) and
Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093 ( 1920)
are representative of the Utah cases. The innumerable
cases from other courts are collected at 4 C.J.S., Appeal
and Error, § 228, p. 665, note 70.
The reasons for refusing to entertain on appeal matters not raised in or presented to the lower court are
based on the practical necessity of an orderly administration of law and on fairness to the trial court and the
opposite party. To entertain defendants' assertions here
8
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would be to make far reaching decisions of fact and la\v
in a vacuum-without the benefit of either evidence or
record-without allowing plaintiff an opportunity to present his side of the controversy and would deny plaintiff
his right to a jury trial on these important matters. Accordingly, the entirety of defendants' arguments concerning the Dead Man Statute and the Wrongful Death
Act is premature. For these reasons this court must decline to pass upon the issues thus raised for the first time
on appeal by defendants.
POINT III. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO,
THAT DEFENDANTS' POINT III WERE
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT FOR REVIEW, WHICH IT IS NOT, IT WOULD AVAIL
DEFENDANTS NOTHING BECAUSE ( 1) THE
CONTENTION THAT PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEl~
ADMITTED THAT HE HAD NO EVIDENCE
OTHER THAN THAT FROM THE PLAINTIFF
HIMSELF IS A BIASED DISTORTION OF ONE
COMMENT WRENCHED OUT OF CONTEXT
AND DOES NOT REFLECT THE TRUTH, (2)
THE DEAD MAN STATUTE DOES NOT DISQUALIFY THE PLAINTIFF FROM TESTIFYING AND (3) THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACT
AIDS RATHER THAN HINDERS PLAINTIFF'S
CASE.
Challenging defendants' arguments concerning the
Dead Man Statute and the Wrongful Death Act is not
to be construed as a waiver of the argument in Point
II that these matters are not properly before the court
9
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for review. Because of the gravity of this matter and
because these issues were argued at some length in defendants' brief plaintiff feels constrained to answer them
and requests the courts indulgence.
The keystone upon which defendants' argument rests
and without which the remainder of the argument has
no merit is the assertion raised at page 31 of their brief
that " ... plaintiff's attorney admitted that the only testimony or evidence supporting the plaintiff's claim was that
of the plaintiff ( R. 90) ." If this assertion concerning
evidence is wrong, the remainder of defendants' argument is valueless. We will show that it is wrong.
This cited comment of counsel must be considered
in light of the setting in which it was made. Arrangements and reservations had been made for the plaintiff
and his California counsel to travel. to Utah for the trial
when, at the last moment, plaintiff, paralyzed from the
neck down by the accident in question, was informed by
his doctors that he would not be able to attend but must
undergo a trans-uretha section (R. 110, 113). Plaintiff's
counsel informed court and opposing counsel as rapidly
as possible of this unexpected turn of events and made
properly and timely a motion for a reasonable continuance. Upon defendants' repeated insistence that the
motion was not timely or sufficient, the court denied the
motion and plaintiff was forced to go to trial. Obviously
certain elements of plaintiff's case could only be properly
presented through the plaintiff himself. This would include evidence concerning the extent of his injuries, pain
and suffering, and other elements of which he would be
able to testify regardless of the application or not of the
10
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Dead Man Statute. He should be allowed to testify
as to tnany, if not all, of the independent facts concerning the accident. The cited comment of counsel must
be considered in light of the comment next preceeding
it on the same page of the record ( R. 90, line 4) but not
mentioned in defendants' brief. Counsel said
I would like the record to show, Mr. Reporter,
that this particular exhibit, Plaintiff's exhibit No.
1 which purports to be a deposition of the Plaintiff Paul Bairas, is the only sworn testimony of
the Plaintiff, Paul Bairas, that is available at this
time. (emphasis added)
It is clear upon a reading of the record that the comment
cited by defendants had the same meaning as the comment quoted above but not referred to by defendants.
In the interest of a fair and honest presentation of
plaintiff's position to this court we feel compelled to add
that defendants' assertion that plaintiff had no other
testimony or evidence is improperly asserted for another
reason. That reason is that the plaintiff did have other
witnesses under subpoena. In fact one of the witnesses
whose names were called by defendants' counsel when
plaintiff moved for the exclusion of witnesses, Mr. Crosby
(R. 83), was under the plaintiff's subpoena. Others under
subpoena were not in the courtroom at that moment.
Just as defendants felt compelled in their statement of
facts to recite matters not in the record (and they so
indicate) ( R. 9, voir dire examination of jurors) so does
plaintiff feel compelled to bring these matters to the
court's attention in order that incompleteness of the
record will not prejudice this court's duty to reach a just
11
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decision. Of course, we stand ready to show to this court's
satisfaction the truth of our assertions concerning other
witnesses.
Building upon their erroneous conclusion that the
only evidence available to plaintiff was that of the
plaintiff himself, the defendants next argue that the Dead
Man Statute, Utah Code Anno. 1953, 78-24-2 ( 3), absolutely precludes the use of any or all of this evidence.
This portion of defendants' argument is also untenable.
In support of their contention defendants cite four cases,
one each from Utah, Wyoming, Nevada and Nebraska.
With all due deference to prior members of this
court, we respectfully submit that the Utah case, Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P. 2d 122 ( 1946)
is not precedent for anything in this regard but that the
entire discussion in the majority opinion and in the concurring opinion concerning the Dead Man Statute is,
unfortunately, only potentially misleading and confusing
dicta. The case was reversed on the question of the
validity of a receipt-having no bearing on the Dead
Man Statute issue. Accordingly defendants' assertion that
the Maxfield case states the Utah law in this regard
deserves little weight.
It is true that the cases from those states which have
unfortunately been saddled with this blind and senseless
exception to the generally prevailing rule of no disqualification because of interest are in hopeless conflict.
Any attempt to reconcile them would be futile. We will
show, however, that the view advocated by the defendants is not the majority view as they state (Brief 31) but
12
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on the contrary is the minority view, and a \\·an1ng
minority view at that.
It appears that of the jurisdictions which have apparently considered the question of whether the Dead
Man Statute should be strictly construed and thus used
to \vithhold needed evidence in automobile accident
cases, or liberally construed and thus not used unnecessarily to withhold evidence in automobile accident cases,
only seven (plus possibly one state which construed a
similar statute concerned with partnership matters) adhere to the strict view while the remaining ten favor the
liberal position. Of the ten favoring the liberal position
seven of the decisions are within the last eight years while
only t\vo of the decisions favoring the strict view are
within the last twenty-one years-they happen to be the
Nevada and Nebraska cases upon which defendants rely.
Texas and Alabama have by recent decisions moved from
the strict interpretation camp to the liberal one. Citations
to these various authorities will be listed later, and are
to be found in an exhaustive annotation at 80 A.L.R.2d

1296.
Those cases which use the statute to preclude testimony
to the greatest extent possible give such reasons as ( 1)
prior cases on other matters have construed "transaction" to include every variety of affairs and it must be
so construed here; ( 2) the purpose of the statute is to
equalize and spread the disability whenever possible;
( 3) mankind is so inherently dishonest and the judicial
process so faulty that we must deny the survivor a chance
to speak in order to forestall the looting of estates by
false claims; ( 4) although "transaction" can be judicially
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construed to include every variety of affairs, contrary to
its usual and ordinary meaning, it cannot be construed
according to its usual and ordinary meaning because so
to do would be judicial legislation; and ( 5) although
the harshness and undesirability of this result is recognized by almost all courts and writers only the legislature
has the power or the responsibility to do anything about it.
Jurisdictions and rna jor cases representing this strict
interpretation viewpoint are: Georgia, Rogers v. Carmichael, 58 Ga.App. 343, 198 S.E. 318 ( 1938) dealing
with a partnership statute; Illinois, VanMeter v. Goldfarb, 31 7 I Ill. 620, 148 N.E. 391 ( 1925) ; Kentucky,
Miller v. W alsh"'s A~dministratrix, 240 Ky. 822, 43 S.W.
2d 42 ( 1931); Nebraska, Re Mueller-'s Estate, 166 Neb.
376, 89 N.W.2d 137 (1958); Nevada, Zeigler v. Moore_,
335 P.2d 425 (Nev. 1959); North Carolina, Davis v.
Pearson, 220 N.C. 163, 16 S.E.2d 655 ( 1941); West Virginia, Willhide v. Biggs, 118 W.Va. 160, 188 S.E. 876
(1936); and Wyoming, Stephens v. Short, 41 Wyo. 324,
285 P. 797 ( 1930).
On the other hand, the decisions representing the
majority and growing view that the rule is either inapplicable to automobile accidents or must be liberally construed so as not to exclude evidence of the facts and
occurrences of the accident voice such reasons as: ( 1 )
this provision is an anachronism persisting, truly, from
the dark past when all parties in interest were disqualified
as witnesses; ( 2) as such it is a harsh rule, and since
all states have adopted liberal party testimony admission statutes, this rule is an exception only to the general
rule and the general rule must be liberally construed
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and this exception strictly construed in order to accomplish the primary objective of the general statute; ( 3)
there is no reason to believe that justice is done by denying this testimony and that in fact many more honest
claims are unjustly defeated than unjust claims are
th\varted; ( 4) the guarantees of cross examination are
adequate and effective to prevent fraudulent claims;
( 5) by its plain and usual meaning "transaction" refers
to a contractual or other mutual type of negotiation or
business relationship and not to the independent facts
of an automobile accident as such; ( 6) that to extend
the meaning of "transaction" to embrace every type of
affairs \vould be an unwarranted judicial extension unintended by the legislature; ( 7) in any event, it is going
too far to say that "transaction" applies to any and all
aspects of an automobile accident; ( 8) the question is
not whether the matter sounds in contract or in tort
but \vhether it is a transaction in the usual and ordinary
meaning of that word; (9) automobile accidents are not,
as such, transactions, but are independent facts.
Jurisdictions and major cases representing this more
liberal viewpoint are: Alabama, Gibson v. McDonald,
265 Ala. 426, 91 So.2d 679 (1956); Arkansas, Rankin
v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 102 S.W.2d 552 (1937);
Florida, Herring v. Eiland, 81 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1955) ;
Day v. Stickle, 113 So.2d 559 (Fla. App. 1959) ; Iowa,
Turbot v. Repp, 247 Iowa 69, 72 N.W.2d 565 ( 1955);
Maryland, Sheneybrook v. Blizzard, 209 Md. 304, 121
A.2d 218 (1956); New York, McCarthy v. Woolston,
210 App. Div. 152, 205 N.Y.S. 507 ( 1924) (since affirmed by statute); North Dakota, Knoepfle v. Suko, 108
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N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1961); Tennessee, Christofiel v.
johnson, 40 Tenn. App. 197, 290 S.W.2d 215 (1956);
Texas, Harper v. johnson, 345 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. 1961);
Wisconsin, Krantz v. Krantz, 211 Wis. 249, 248 N.W.
155 (1933); Seligman v. Hammond, 205 Wis. 199, 236
N.W. 115 (1931).
Except for the Nevada and Nebraska cases, representing a small to negligible population effect, the strong
modern trend and the decided weight of authority favor
the admission of the testimony of a survivor of an automobile accident as to the facts of the accident.
Since this court has not previously spoken about the
Dead Man Statute and automobile accidents, it is unfettered by undesirable precedent. It is free to analyze
the problem in the light of the better reasoned cases
and the more desirable social results.
The better analysis of this problem would follow the
approach below described.
We have adopted the common law, but only so far
as it is appropriate to our conditions. Utah Code Anno.
1953, 68-3-1. The harsh rule that statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be strictly construed has been
abolished by Utah Code Anno. 1953, 68-3-2, which provides that
The rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed
has no application to the statutes of this state.
The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and
their provisions and all proceedings under them
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect
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the objects of the statutes and to promote justice....
The statute removing generally the disqualification previously imposed on parties at the common law, Utah
Code Anno. 1953, 78-24-1, is in derogation of the harsh
common law rule and is to be liberally construed to
effect its objects and to promote justice. The exception
to this statute-the Dead Man Statute, Utah Code Anno.
1953, 78-24-2 ( 3) -is but a restatement of the harsh
common law rule which must be strictly construed because to do otherwise would run afoul of the legislative
mandate that the general statute be liberaly construed.
This aspect of the analysis of the problem has been
adopted by the better reasoned cases. Knoepfle v. Suko,
108 N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1961); Harper v. johnson, 345
S.W.2d 277 (Tex. 1961); Shaneybrook v. Blizzard, 209
Md. 304, 121 A.2d 218 (1956); Day v. Stickle, 113 So.2d
559 (Fla. App. 1959); McCarthy v. Woolston, 210 App.
Div. 152, 205 N.Y.S. 507 (1924); Rankin v. Morgan,
193 Ark. 751, 102 S.W.2d 552 ( 1937).
Following this line of thought, the better reasoned
cases admit tetstimony of the survivor of an automobile
collision as to all the independent facts of the accident,
speed, direction of travel, location of vehicles, action of
drivers, existing conditions and so on. Knoepfle v. Suko,
108 N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1961); Harper v. johnson, 345
S.W.2d 277 (Tex. 1961); Shaneybrook v. Blizzard, 209
~I d. 304, 121 A.2d 218 ( 1956); Day v. Stickle, 113 So.
2d 559 (Fla.App. 1959); Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark.
751, 102 S.W.2d 552 (1937); Turbot v. Repp. 247 Iowa
69, 72 S.W.2d 565 ( 1955); Seligman v. Hammond, 205
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Wis. 199, 236 N.W. 115 (1931); Gibson v. McDonald,
265 Ala. 426, 91 So. 2d 679 ( 1956).
Again, the better reasoned cases dealing with one
car accidents arrive at the same conclusion, admitting the
survivor's testimony. Christofiel v. johnson, 40 Tenn.App.
197, 290 S.W.2d 215 ( 1956); Krantz v. Krantz, 211 Wis.
249, 248 N.W. 155 ( 1933); Herring v. Eiland, 81 So.2d
645 (Fla. 1955) ; McCarthy v. Woolston, 210 App. Div.
152, 205 N.Y.S. 507 ( 1924).
This line of reasoning would give the statute its normal and logical interpretation, would admit evidence in
accord with the mandate of the general statute on admissibility of evidence and would implement what must
have been the legislative intent, because, while the Dead
Man Statute may be harsh when applied to business and
commercial affairs it is not asking the impossible for
people to put their negotiations and agreements in writing, but it is asking the impossible to expect them to
reduce the facts of an automobile accident to an admissible writing. In fact, we respectfully submit, the legislature did not have the independent facts of an automobile accident in mind at all when in 1894 the Dead Man
Statute exception was enacted in substantially its present
form. Laws of Utah, 1894, p. 26-27.
Such minority view cases as those cited by defendants,
Re Mueller's Estate, 166 Neb. 376, 89 N.W.2d 137
(1958) and Zeigler v. Moore, 335 P.2d 425 (Nev. 1959)
have but two arguments in their favor. ( 1) The rule
they establish is easy of application and ( 2) they keep
pacified and quiet the vocal insurance lobbies which
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have no higher motivation than the minimization of just
claims. Little else can be said in their favor.
If and when a case involving the Dead Man Statute
and an automobile accident is properly presented to this
court, right reason and logic will require that this court
so construe the statute as to effect the humane and
socially desirable ends attainable only by admission of
all evidence available in such cases.
The final contention made by defendants in this line
of argument is that, and again assuming no evidence to
be available other than that of the plaintiff himself, the
Wrongful Death Act (Utah Code Anno. 1953, 78-11-12)
compels affirmance of the lower court because of the
provision in that act that the plaintiff "shall not recover
judgment except upon some competent satisfactory evidence, other than the testimony of said injured person."
We have shown that there was evidence available
other than the testimony of plaintiff himself. Accordingly, even were this contention ripe for appeal, it would
fail.
Not only does this provision not assist defendants,
it assists plaintiff. When it is considered that this is a
recently enacted statute, the quoted phrase can have had
no effect intended other than to repeal the disqualification in the Dead Man Statute but in so doing to request
some other independent evidence in corroboration.
Accordingly, were it ripe for appeal, the Wrongful
Death Act would not require affirmance but reversal of
the lower court, which must in any event for other reasons
be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the initial brief and in
this reply brief, plaintiff respectfully submits that the
trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant
plaintiff's timely motion for a continuance and in failing
to grant plaintiff's motion for a change of venue.
Plaintiff renews the prayer of its initial brief that
this court reverse or vacate the judgment of the lower
court and remand this case for a trial on the merits in
a county free from bias and prejudice, and in any event
that it be reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
Gardner & Bums
25 East Lincoln Avenue
Cedar City, Utah
Nathan Goller
91 71 Wilshire Blvd.
Beverly Hills, California
Attorneys for the Appellant
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